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Abstract: Recently both the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority have carried 
out experiments using new digital technology for regulatory purposes. The idea is to replace rules 
written in natural legal language with computer code and to use artificial intelligence for 
regulatory purposes. This new way of designing public law is in line with the government’s vision 
for the UK to become a global leader in digital technology. It is also reflected in the FCA’s 
business plan. The article reviews the technology and the advantages and disadvantages of 
combining the technology with regulatory law. It then informs the discussion from a broader 
public law perspective. It analyses regulatory technology through criteria developed in the 
mainstream regulatory discourse. It contributes to that discourse by anticipating problems that 
will arise as the technology evolves. In addition, the hope is to assist the government in avoiding 
mistakes that have occurred in the past and creating a better system from the start. 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
Technology changes society. Distributed ledger technology has been described as 
having the potential to disrupt how and by whom financial and other services are 
delivered and regulated.1 Artificial intelligence already does and will increasingly 
shape our society in the future.2 The law needs to adapt to this change and can 
benefit from it. 
This is at present particularly true for financial regulation. Recent advances in 
computer science could produce technological solutions that facilitate financial 
regulation.3 Such solutions have been referred to as ‘regulatory technology’. 
Regulatory technology has been described as a game changer.4 It is said to have the 
potential to streamline compliance and increase efficiency for both the regulator and 
the regulated entities in financial markets.5 It could enable the regulator to supervise 
the entire population of regulated entities relying on deep evidence delivered in real 
time. It could free up regulatory capital or remove the need for it altogether. Brexit 
gives the UK greater freedom to develop a framework of its own. The government 
is keen for the UK to become a global leader in digital technology.6 Now seems like 
a good time to incorporate new digital technology into regulation.   
A significant amount of academic work has been done on FinTech, the 
combination of digital technology with the delivery of financial services.7 The use 
                                                
1 The Economist, ‘Hype springs eternal; The blockchain in finance’ The Economist (London, 19 March 
2016) 73. 
2 Two recent covers of The Economist focus on Artificial Intelligence: 4 January 2018: The Next Frontier 
– When Thoughts Control Machines and 3 February 2018: Doctor You – A Revolution in Health Care is 
Coming.  The issue of 14 February 2018 contains seven articles that use the term 'artificial intelligence': 
pages 12, 30, 60, 68, 69, 78 and 79. 
3 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Call for Input: Supporting the Development and Adoption of RegTech’ 
(23 November 2015), available at <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/call-input-supporting-
development-and-adoption-regtech> accessed 14 June 2018. 
4 Douglas W Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross P Buckley, ‘FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization 
of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 371; Luca 
Enriques, Financial Supervisors and Regtech: Four Roles and Four Challenges (2017) Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Financier 53. 
5 Veerle Colaert, ‘RegTech as a Response to Regulatory Expansion in the Financial Sector’ para 8 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2677116> accessed 14 June 2018; Nizan 
Geslevich Packin, 'Regtech, Compliance and Technology Judgment Rule' (2018) 93 (1) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 193 at 206-207; Arner et al (n 4) 374-375 and 388-389; see also Douglas W Arner, Janos 
Nathan Barberis and Ross P Buckley, ‘The Emergence of Regtech 2.0: ‘From Know Your Customer to 
Know Your Data’ (2016) 44 Journal of Financial Transformation 79; Institute of International Finance, 
‘RegTech in Financial Services: Solutions for Compliance and Reporting’ (March 2016) 2 
<https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-services-solutions-compliance-and-
reporting> accessed 14 June 2018. 
6 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, BEIS Digital, Data and Technology (DDaT) 
Strategy 2017 – 2020 (November 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
87480/BEIS_DDaT_Strategy.pdf> accessed 22 June 2018. 
7 See for example most recently, Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘A Rational Regulatory Strategy for Governing Financial 
Innovation’ (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 743; for a general analysis of financial 
innovation from a regulatory perspective see Emilios Evgoulas, ‘Regulating Financial Innovation’ in 
Niamh Moloney, Eili ́s Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 
2015) 660. 
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of technology for the purpose of financial regulation has not yet received a 
substantial amount of attention. This is not surprising as the process of integrating 
digital technology into regulation is still in flux and so the discussion has focused on 
the possibilities generated by and the risks associated with the technology. Recent 
developments, however, indicate that regulatory technology has reached a stage in 
its development where it benefits from broader analytical scrutiny. 
An increasing number of technology focused start-ups are attempting to 
develop regulatory technology.8 Regulated entities are interested because the 
increase in regulatory requirements following the financial crisis has made 
compliance costly.9 Regulators are interested because they too want to save money.10 
They also would like to promote growth and support innovation.11 Both the 
Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England have recently carried out 
experiments involving the use of new digital technologies.  
The aim of this article is to go beyond operational questions and inform the 
discussion from a broader perspective. The article brings the area under the scrutiny 
of the mainstream regulatory discourse. It also contributes to that discourse by 
anticipating the problems that will arise as the technology evolves. In addition, the 
hope is to assist the regulator and regulated entities in avoiding mistakes that have 
occurred in the past and creating a better system right from the start.  
In Section 2 the technology will be examined. After that two potential use cases 
for regulatory technology and their effect on the regulatory landscape will be 
discussed: digital reporting and artificial intelligence as a risk management tool. The 
process of reporting individual data points could be organised through distributed 
ledger technology and combined with artificial intelligence. In the future, artificial 
intelligence could be incorporated into prudential regulation to monitor the records 
of a broader range of transactions or perhaps even the entire IT system of regulated 
entities (section 3). Then criteria that have been developed to scrutinise regulatory 
quality will be mapped onto regulatory technology (section 4).  Section 5 will take 
the analysis to a more particular level by examining how the challenges posed by the 
integration of digital technology into regulation vary according to regulatory 
strategy. The paper will discuss command regulation, self-regulatory models and 
meta-regulation. Section 6 will conclude and make recommendations.   
The main conclusion of the article is that regulatory technology poses different 
challenges depending on the regulatory strategy adopted by the government. The 
technology itself, however, serves those who pay for its development. It does not 
deliver a silver bullet that will make it easier for regulated entities to align their 
business interests with the public interest.  
                                                
8 Colaert (n 5) para 45; Arner et al (n 4) 381. 
9 Colaert (n 5) para 8; Arner et al (n 4) 374-375 and 388-389. 
10 Financial Conduct Authority, Business Plan 2018/19, 27 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/corporate-documents/our-business-plan-2018-19> accessed 16 
April 2018.             
11 Dirk A Zetzsche, Ross P Buckley, Douglas W Arner and Janos Nathan Barberis, ‘Regulating a 
Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation’ (2017) 23 Fordham Journal of Corporate 
and Financial Law 31 at 34. 
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Another important point is that the role of technology providers will have to 
be kept under review. As regulatory technology is integrated into regulation the 
providers of technology become positioned as gatekeepers but do not necessarily 
have the right incentives to operate in the public interest. The problems that can 
emerge are exacerbated by the fact that there is a potential for the oligopolistic 
market that is currently dominating data analysis to move into the realm of 
regulation. 
If the regulator integrates new digital technologies it will need to retain a 
substantial amount of oversight over its design to be able to retain democratic 
legitimacy and accountability as well as operate on the basis of due process.  
 
II. THE TECHNOLOGY 
At present, neither the Financial Conduct Authority nor the Bank of England have 
adopted or endorsed any particular technological solution.  They are, however, 
holding themselves ready and are proactively engaging with market participants.  
The FCA launched its ‘Project Innovate’ in October 2014.12 The project includes 
regulatory technology.13 The Bank of England has created a Fintech Hub which 
incorporates the work that the Bank has carried out in relation to integrating new 
digital technologies into its own organisation.14 
Because regulatory technology is in development it is worth considering more 
broadly what those creating such tools are using for inspiration. There are a number 
of new digital technologies which can support regulatory aims. These technologies 
and their components will be introduced in this section. 
 
1. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY 
 
Distributed ledger technology was developed for Bitcoin which is a form of 
money that is not backed by the government of any state. It was designed as a peer-
to-peer system that enabled individuals to transfer money without using banks. A 
record of which individual owns how much money is shared publicly between the 
participating individuals who each hold an identical copy of the entire record on 
their own home computer. This record is referred to as a distributed ledger. 
Participants are not identified by name but by a number which is referred to as 
‘public key’. The ledger is updated by consensus of the participants. Each participant 
has a passcode referred to as ‘private key’ to access their own money.  
Distributed ledger technology can be combined with what is referred to as a 
smart contract. This is a computer programme which runs on a distributed ledger 
                                                
12 <https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/fca-innovate> accessed 14 June 2018; see also FCA Feedback 
Statement FS 16/4 to Call for input on supporting the development and adopters of RegTech (July 2016) 
13 – 14, <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs-16-04.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018.  
13 <https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regtech> accessed 14 June 2018. 
14 <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/fintech> accessed 14 June 2018. 
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and automatically transfers money when certain pre-defined events occur. For 
example, it pays out a certain sum at regular intervals or when an index reaches a 
certain level.  
Bitcoin started as a libertarian project but the technology also lends itself to 
non-libertarian applications. The Bitcoin ledger itself has, since it first started, 
developed into an intermediated system where those participants who maintain the 
register are no longer individuals but have become similar to custodians.15  
A distributed ledger could be used by banks or other financial services 
providers.16 The Bank of England has, for example, conducted tests to determine if 
the technology could be used for its inter-bank settlement system. It concluded that 
at present the technology is not mature enough but is ensuring that its new RTGS 
system will be compatible with the technology.17 
The technology can also be used to record ownership of assets other than 
money.18 The use of distributed ledger technology for assets is currently being 
explored by start-ups as well as incumbent market participants. The FCA have 
published a discussion paper in April 2017 and a feedback statement in December 
2017.19 If market participants develop a DLT system through which they hold and 
transfer financial assets, this could be connected with regulatory technology. The 
regulator could become a participant enabling it to monitor, supervise and audit 
trades including smart contracts.20 
A distributed ledger can also be used to share information. This component of 
the technology could be of interest for regulatory purposes. We will see below that 
the FCA has conducted experiments to use the technology for regulatory reporting.  
 
2.ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
It is difficult to define ‘intelligence’ and there is no generally accepted definition 
of ‘artificial intelligence’.21 Artificial intelligence includes software that is able to play 
                                                
15 Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde, ‘Holding, clearing and settling securities through 
blockchain/distributed ledger technology: creating an efficient system by empowering investors’ (2016) 
31 (11) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 631. 
16 Philipp Paech, 'Blockchain Financial Networks', (2017) 80 (6) Modern Law Review 1073. 
17 For more information see <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/fintech/proof-of-concept> 
accessed 14 June 2018. 
18 Micheler et al (n 15); The Australian Stock Exchange has announced that it will operate its clearing and 
settlement system using distributed ledger technology from 2020 (James Eyers, ‘ASX blockchain to go 
live at the end of 2020’ Australian Financial Review 27 April 2018 
<https://www.afr.com/technology/asx-blockchain-to-go-live-at-end-of-2020-20180427-h0zcgx> 
accessed 4 July 2018; see also https://www.asx.com.au/services/chess-replacement.htm). 
19 Financial Conduct Authority, Discussion Paper on Distributed Ledger Technology (DP17/3, April 2017), page 
6 <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-03.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018; Financial 
Conduct Authority, Distributed Ledger Technology: Feedback Statement on Discussion Paper 17/03 (FS17/4, 
December 2017), <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs17-04.pdf> accessed 25 February 
2018 
20 Garrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs, 2017 Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study (22 September, 
2017), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040224> page 64, accessed 25 February 2018. 
21 Matthew U Scherer, 'Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and 
Strategies' (2016) 29 (2) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 359; Kay Firth-Butterfield, Richard Brent and 
Tony Grant, ‘The Future of Financial Crime: Virtual Currencies, Artificial Intelligence and Emerging 
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games such as chess or go calculating its way through potential combinations of 
moves.22 It also includes software that perceives and reacts to the surrounding 
environment enabling it to control cars autonomously.23 For the purposes of 
financial regulation two applications of artificial intelligence are of interest: machine 
learning and natural language processing.  
 
2.1Machine Learning 
Financial regulation could benefit from software that reviews large amounts of 
data to identify patterns that may indicate unusual activity or previously unnoticed 
correlations indicating that certain risks may have emerged. Such programmes are 
already used for fraud prevention purposes where they monitor credit and debit 
card transactions. They are sometimes referred to as machine learning.  
Risk is also visible in communication patterns. In a recent study the authors 
have, for example, analysed emails sent by 144 senior Enron employees in the lead 
up to the company’s collapse. They found that in addition to certain terms that 
appear in such emails and that indicate emerging problems, the length of emails and 
their frequency are indicators of escalating problems.24 It would be possible to use 
this form of analysis for regulatory purposes.  
 
2.2 Transforming natural language into computer language 
Connected with machine learning is a technique in computer science where 
computers process speech or written text created by human beings. A type of this 
form of technology is used by Google Translate and by digital assistants such as 
Alexa, Google or Siri. It is also used by businesses to operate telephone systems or 
customer service centres.  
For financial regulation, similar technology can be used to read rules and 
translate their content into computer programmes which then process data. At 
present the software is not yet sufficiently advanced to adequately cope with the full 
spectrum of subtleties used in human language. For this reason, a double translation 
process is evolving. In a first step natural language is transformed into a machine-
readable version. This is similar to the process of adapting natural speech to the 
requirements of digital assistants or telephone operators. This machine-readable 
version is then processed to create a programme that automates certain regulatory 
tasks.25 We will see below that this technology has recently been used in experiments 
carried out by the FCA. 
                                                
Legal Questions’ in William Blair, Richard Brent, Tony Grant and Andrew Bodnar (eds), Banks and 
Financial Crime: The International Law of Tainted Money (2nd ed, OUP 2017) chapter 24. 
22 Scherer (n 21) 361 and 364. 
23 Firth-Butterfield et al (n 21). 
24 Das Sanjiv Ranjan, Kim Seoyoung and Kothari Bhushan, ‘Zero-Revelation RegTech: Detecting Risk 
through Linguistic Analysis of Corporate Emails and News’, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909380> 
accessed 5 March 2018. 
25 For an excellent explanation of this type of technology see <https://digital-legislation.net> accessed 4 
July 2018; Tom Butler, Standard-based Semantic Technologies for Smart Regulation, White Paper, 
Governance, Risk & Compliance Technology Centre, University of Cork (February 2017) 6-9 < 
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III. COMBATING TECHNOLOGY WITH REGULATION 
 
In the previous section, new digital technologies have been introduced. In this 
section and in the remaining sections of this paper two potential ways of integrating 
these technologies with financial regulation will be discussed. The first use case 
builds on the computer science experiments currently carried out by the FCA. The 
second use case takes the current experiments as a starting point but is, for the time 
being, science fiction. It investigates the implications of using artificial intelligence 
as a risk management tool.  
 
1. DIGITAL REGULATORY REPORTING 
 
The FCA are currently working with the Bank of England to explore whether 
digital regulatory reporting could reduce the 'compliance burden’ affecting regulated 
entities.26 In what are referred to as 'TechSprints' they explore using distributed 
ledger and language processing technology for 'regulation, compliance procedures, 
firms' policies and standards together with firm transactional applications and 
databases.'27   
At present the FCA and the Bank of England operate a database referred to as 
Gabriel.28 Regulated entities collect their internal information, produce an electronic 
report and submit it to Gabriel. This involves manual processes which take time and 
are prone to mistakes. When the FCA receives the reports they verify completeness, 
consistency and compliance with the requirements.29 Regulated entities as well as 
the regulator believe that they would benefit from a system that removes manual 
processes from regulatory reporting.30 Gabriel, which came live in 2011, is likely to 
benefit from an upgrade in the not-so-distant future. Brexit means more freedom 
for the UK to develop new ways of regulating financial services and the government 
has a vision for the country to become a leader in digital technologies.31    
Distributed ledger technology has shown ways of sharing information. A 
distributed ledger could be created that contains the records for reportable 
                                                
http://www.grctc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/GRCTC-Standards-based-Semantic-
Technologies-for-Smart-Regulation-White-Paper-2017.pdf>. 
26 FCA, Call for Input: Using technology to achieve smarter regulatory reporting (Febuary 2018) para 3.2-
3.4 <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/call-for-input/call-for-input-smarter-regulatory-reporting.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2018. 
27 FCA, Model driven and machine executable reporting 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/events/techsprints/model-driven-machine-executable-regulatory-reporting-
techsprint> accessed 15 June 2018. 
28 < https://gabriel.fca.org.uk/portal_authentication_service/appmanager/merportal/desktop>, 
accessed 18 June 2018. 
29 FCA (n 26) paras 3.2 - 3.5. 
30 Institute of International Finance, ‘RegTech in Financial Services: Solutions for Compliance and 
Reporting’ (March 2016) 5-7 <https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-services-
solutions-compliance-and-reporting> accessed 14 June 2018. 
31 Above (n 6). 
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transactions of all regulated entities. This ledger would serve as an internal booking 
system as well as a reporting device. Regulated entities would record transactions as 
they do now but instead of doing this on an internal database the record would be 
made on a distributed ledger. The regulator would be supplied with direct access to 
that ledger. Cryptography would ensure that while the records are visible to the 
regulator other regulated entities do not have access to business sensitive 
information from their competitors.  
Language processing was used to develop software to run on such a ledger. It 
translated the requirements for mortgage reporting contained in the FCA 
Handbook (SUP 16.11) from English into computer code.32 It mapped the 
'regulatory requirements directly to the data … creating the potential for automated, 
straight-through-processing of regulatory returns.' The TechSprint was successful.  
The conclusion was that, from a computer science perspective, it is possible to 
translate rules on mortgage reporting written in English into a machine-readable 
and executable form. This machine-readable version of English can be used to 
create software. That software then retrieves data and creates a report for the 
regulator from a distributed ledger. That software can also be updated reflecting 
regulatory changes.33 
In the future, the regulator and regulated entities could share the records of 
reportable transactions enabling the regulator to access the information on these as 
it is held directly with the regulated entities. Regulated entities no longer submit 
reports. The regulator would help itself to data on transactions. It could even use 
software with a ‘smart contract’ functionality that identifies breaches, makes 
suggestions for sanctions or perhaps even automatically issues fines.34  
 
2. MACHINE LEARNING AS A RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL 
 
It would be possible to extend the access for regulatory software to more than 
just specific transactions. Such software could access the records of all transactions 
entered into by regulated entities. This could be combined with machine learning.35 
Software could be developed that autonomously analyses transactions as they are 
recorded by the regulated entity. The analysis could be extended to the entire 
information system operated by a regulated entity. In addition to transaction records 
regulatory software could monitor other data files, email and voice communication 
                                                
32 <https://www.fca.org.uk/events/techsprints/model-driven-machine-executable-regulatory-reporting-
techsprint>, accessed 5 March 2918. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Financial Conduct Authority, RegTech Work Programme 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regtech/our-work-programme> accessed 5 March 2018; Financial 
Conduct Authority, Feedback Statement FS 16/4 to call for input on supporting the development and 
adopters of RegTech, July 2016 pages 8-9 < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs-16-
04.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018; Philip Treleaven, ‘Financial Regulation of Fintech’ (2015) 3 (3) Journal of 
Financial Perspectives <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084015> accessed 3 July 
2018. 
35 Arner et al (n 4) 382. 
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carried out by employees of regulated entities. This would be a step up from keeping 
records of telephone conversations and email exchanges and would have to be done 
through a form of analysis that is consistent with protecting the personal 
information of individuals.36 
The software could be taught to autonomously identify risk as it emerges. 
Regulators and regulated entities would be able to locate and address problems at 
an earlier stage than they are now. The software could be integrated into the 
regulation of micro-prudential risk management as a tool helping to prevent 
individual firms form failing.37 There is a suggestion that this might liberate 
regulatory capital. Capital requirements could even be replaced with machine 
learning analytics allowing a broader and deeper range of information to be 
processed in the analysis of financial institutions.38 
This could be combined with a smart contract functionality which, like in the 
first use case, automates enforcement.  
 
3. OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES AND RISKS  
 
In this sub-section, the operational advantages and risks associated with the 
technology will be examined. Regulatory technology could make compliance easier 
for regulated entities. It could make regulation more nimble and precise and supply 
the regulator with more accurate and real time information. It could support 
regulatory processes by informing them through data-based analysis. Levels of 
standardisation may increase. Like any form of innovation, new technology is 
associated with risks that are, for the time being, unknown. Regulatory technology 
introduces a new type of service provider to the regulatory environment.  
 
3.1 Making compliance easy  
At present the FCA regulates the outcome, rather than process, in accordance 
with the statutory objectives of ensuring consumer protection, market integrity and 
competitive markets. The regulator acts on the basis of legislation. Based on their 
mandate they write rules in the version of English that is customarily used in a legal 
context and publish them. The FCA is neutral towards the technology used by the 
entities it regulates.39 It does not matter how firms maintain records or organise 
themselves as long as they produce the reports required and comply otherwise with 
                                                
36 Colaert (n 5) para 57. 
37 Institute of International Finance (n 30) 11-13; more generally on the challenges of micro-prudential 
regulation see Rosa Lastra, ‘Defining Forward-Looking Judgement Based Supervision’ (2013) 14 (3) 
Journal of Banking Regulation 221; for the role of capital in micro-prudential regulation and also for 
many see Alexander Kern, ‘The Role of Capital in Supporting Banking Stability’ in 
Niamh Moloney, Eili ́s Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 
2015) 335; see also Peter O Mülbert, ‘Managing Risk in the Financial System’ in Moloney et al, ibid 365 at 
369-381.  
38 Arner et al (n 4) 396; Institute of International Finance (n 30) 11-13. 
39 FCA (n 26) para 2.6; FCA, Discussion Paper on Distributed Ledger Technology (DP17/3, April 2017) 
accessible at: <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-03.pdf>, page 5, accessed 5 March 
2018. 
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rules contained in the Handbook and its underlying legislation. Regulated entities 
carry the risk of interpreting the rules and putting in place a system that ensures that 
they comply.40 They employ human beings who read and interpret these regulations.  
Each entity takes a view on how to implement them including any technology that 
is used to facilitate compliance. They may seek legal advice and/or liaise with the 
regulator. Compliance is ultimately assessed by the courts. 
Regulatory technology could make compliance easier. Rather than writing rules 
in legal English the regulator could write rules in machine-readable English or 
prescribe particular software applications. This would leave less room for regulated 
entities taking the wrong approach.  
Making compliance straightforward can help to increase levels of compliance.41 
Realistically however, irrespective of the tools used for regulatory purposes 
regulated entities have a choice. They can either observe regulatory requirements or 
alternatively they can appear to be compliant by working out how to avoid detection 
from the regulators including their technology.42 
 
3.2 Making regulation nimble 
At present when the rules are updated each entity reads the new regulations, 
takes a view on how to implement them and updates their systems accordingly 
adding data fields or making other modifications.43 This makes it hard to change 
course. Regulatory software could simplify the process. Adapting to regulatory 
change could become as simple as installing a software update.  
Regulatory technology can also assist with adapting regulation to changes in 
the market. Machine learning can help to analyse regulated entities and markets and 
identify patterns that may indicate the emergence of risk requiring an update of 
regulatory requirements. They may find, for example, that certain practices are 
emerging and incorporate these into their monitoring activity.  
 
3.3 Making regulation more precise  
Computer code is more precise than natural language. The process of 
translating legal English into machine-readable English and onwards into computer 
code will make rules more precise.44 Replacing ambiguous legal terms with precise 
computer code changes meaning. By becoming more precise the scope of a rule 
narrows. Removing ambiguity can also cause meaning to shift away from its original 
focus. In addition, computer code has its own albeit more limited ambiguities.  
                                                
40 FCA (n 26) para 3.3. 
41 Arner et al (n 4) 375. 
42 Packin (n 5) 212-215; see also Colaert (n 5) para 57 (in relation to technology that assists bank 
employees to evaluate clients). 
43 FCA (n 26) paras 3.2 - 3.5. 
44 Andrew Burt, Jeremy Aron-Dine, Eugene Kim, Catherine Martinz and Xiangong (George) Wang, 
‘2017 Model Driven and Machine Executable Regulations and Tech Sprint: Success Criteria and 
Recommendations’, page 4, <https://www.immuta.com/download/recommendations-for-the-fca-and-
boes-2017-model-driven-and-machine-executable-regulations-tech-sprint/> accessed 14 June 2018; 
Colaert (n 5) paras 25-26. 
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Coding is a process of working with the limitations of the respective programming 
language.45 Creating regulatory software, while being an exciting exercise in 
computer science, also involves policy choice.46 A decision needs to be made on 
how individual terms are translated and also more broadly on which elements of the 
regulatory framework will benefit from higher levels of precision. 
 
3.4 More accurate and real-time information 
Digital reporting would change what kind of and how quickly information is 
available to the regulator. It could give the regulator access to information as it is 
recorded internally by regulated entities. The regulator would receive more accurate 
information than it does now. It would be supplied with better quality evidence for 
its decision making. It would also be informed about transactions as soon as they 
are booked on the shared record and thus receive a close to real-time picture on the 
transactions entered into by regulated entities.47  
 
3.5 Data-based analysis  
The available evidence can be analysed through artificial intelligence.48 Machine 
learning can process large amounts of information. It can help to identify risk in 
data supplied by regulated entities. This can alert the regulator and regulated entities 
to problems that appear to be emerging. It could also enable the regulator to closely 
supervise the entire population of regulated entities rather than just a selected 
number.49 This has been described as leading to a profound transformation of the 
approach to regulation.50 This analysis also has the potential to be extended to reveal 
macro-economic interconnectedness allowing for better monitoring of macro-
prudential risks.51 
There is a risk, however, that machine driven analysis of facts revealing 
themselves in data becomes associated with an aura of objectivity and analytical 
prowess that does not reflect the scope of the evidence the analysis is based on. The 
problem is not the analysis but the underlying data set. It is easy to overlook the 
limitations of data-based analysis. Diagnostic tools that were based on data collected 
from male individuals can, for example, cause doctors to overlook female patients 
presenting with heart attacks.52 In the context of regulation similar mistakes can 
occur, leading the regulator and regulated entities into a false sense of security.  
                                                
45 Firas Al Khalil, Marcello Ceci, Leona O'Brien and Tom Butler, ‘A Solution for the Problems of 
Translation and Transparency in Smart Contracts’ (February 2017) <http://www.grctc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/GRCTC-Smart-Contracts-White-Paper-2017.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018. 
46 See also Packin (n 5) 193 at 215-217. 
47 Burt et al (n 44) 4; Arner et al (n 4) 371 at 382. 
48 Packin (n 5) 193 at 207; Arner et al (n 4) 371 at 382. 
49 Susan C Morse, ‘Government-Robot-Enforcement’, University of Texas Law Public Law Research 
Paper No 696, 10-15 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3143716> accessed 15 
June 2018, (2019) University of Illinois Law Review, forthcoming. 
50 Arner et al (n 4) 371 at 382-383. 
51 Arner et al (n 4) 371 at 402. 
52 Judith H Lichtman et al, ‘Sex Differences in the Presentation and Perception of Symptoms Among 
Young Patients with Myocardial Infarction’, (2018) 137 (8) Circulation 781. 
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3.6 Standardisation and systemic risk 
At the moment, each regulated entity develops its own understanding of how 
to comply with regulatory requirements. The current rules allow for different 
interpretations which are all equally lawful. This facilitates a variety of business 
models within the financial services industry. If a highly standardised financial 
technology is used across regulated entities the room for variety may be reduced.  
This can facilitate herding. There is therefore a risk that regulated entities become 
increasingly similar causing systemic problems to arise.53  
 
3.7 Technological risks  
Regulatory technology takes advantage of computer science tools that are 
relatively new. Our knowledge and understanding of any new technology is initially 
and invariably limited. In addition, it combines computer science with law. Those 
trained in law do not normally know about the characteristics and limitations of 
computer software. Those trained in computer science are not normally familiar 
with the scope and subtleties of legal terms. Neither group is well placed to 
anticipate problems that may arise when the two are combined. They may not even 
be in a good position to appreciate what it is they do not know. This makes it 
difficult for either group of experts to at least ask the right questions.   
One example are potential errors in the software.54 Lawyers are not in a good 
position to imagine fact patterns. Computer scientists can imagine much better what 
could go wrong. But complex software tends to be opaque and it can be difficult 
even for computer scientist to predict outputs.55 In particular, artificial intelligence 
can operate in ways that are unforeseen by programmers.56 While being better 
placed than lawyers to predict potential problems, computer scientists are, however, 
not in a good position to imagine the implications of these problems for the legal 
context.   
Another example is discriminatory bias. Biases present in the existing data set 
perhaps resulting from manual inspection regimes can easily be converted into 
automated biases. Machine learning operates on the basis of black box decision 
procedures which makes it very difficult to work out even for computer scientists 
whether the outcome is biased and in what direction the bias is directed to.57  
More generally it is impossible to predict how regulatory technology will 
interact with the financial system. It may allow us to better manage risk leading to 
more stable financial institutions or it may turn out to steer us in the wrong 
direction. 
                                                
53 Jon Danielson, 'Artificial intelligence and the stability of financial markets', VOXEU, 15 November 
2017 <https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-and-stability-markets> accessed 5 March 2018; 
Colaert (n 5) para 27 and 55. 
54 Burt et al (n 44) 5. 
55 Burt et al (n 44) 4; see also Scherer (n 21) 359. 
56 Scherer (n 21) 359; Firth-Butterfield (n 21). 
57 The author is very grateful to Mark Staples for this point.  
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3.8 The role of technology providers 
It is possible for the regulator and for regulated entities to develop their own 
bespoke software. That is, however, not likely. Neither are necessarily interested in 
or well-placed for becoming software developers. Pooling their resources, market 
participants have tried to co-operate to develop distributed ledger technology. They 
have set up R3. This has not had much success. The interests of industry participants 
appear to be too diverse to allow for the development of common technology.58 
It is more likely that regulatory technology will introduce a new type of 
participant into the regulatory environment. It has been mentioned briefly at the 
beginning of this article that there is, at present, a vibrant market of start-ups who 
are developing regulatory software.59 RegTech events are populated by 
representatives from these businesses.60 It has been recommended that these market 
participants could be incentivised to engage in the development of regulatory 
technology by allowing some providers preferential access if only for a limited 
time.61  
Special privileges for technology providers should be approached with caution. 
Alongside a start-up community a small number of large companies currently 
dominate the market for data analysis and artificial intelligence. They are potentially 
also interested in serving the financial services industry. One of their strategies for 
growth is to identify and acquire smaller technology companies.62 They bring 
business interests of their own to the table which do not necessarily align with the 
public interest.  
More generally we should be mindful of the problems that have in the past 
arisen in relation to credit rating agencies whose ability to act as gatekeepers was 
severely affected by the business interests.63 We are seeing similar issues in relation 
to auditors whose business model has made it difficult for them to keep up their 
professional scepticism.64 
IV. QUALITY OF REGULATION 
In the previous section, the advantages and disadvantages of the technology have 
been discussed. In this section, regulatory technology will receive scrutiny from a 
                                                
58 Jeff John Robertson, ‘Blockchain Firm R3 Is Running Out of Money, Sources Say’, Fortune Magazine 
7 June 2018 <http://fortune.com/2018/06/07/blockchain-firm-r3-is-running-out-of-money-sources-
say/> accessed 14 June 2018. 
59 See above subsection 0; Colaert (n 5) para 45; Arner et al (n 4) 371 at 381. 
60 See for example the list of speakers and sponsors at the London FinTech Week 2018 
(https://www.fintechweek.com/home) or at the London FinTech Summit 2018 
(https://ifgs.innovatefinance.com/agenda-2018/). 
61 Burt et al (n 44) 8; Zetzsche et al (n 11) 31 at 98. 
62 Scherer (n 21) 359 at 374-375. 
63 Jennifer Payne, ‘The Role of Gatekeppers’ in Moloney et al (n 37) 254; see also Colaert (n 5) para 5-6. 
64 Andrea Mennicken and Michael Power, ‘Auditing and Corporate Governance’ in Mike Wright, Donald 
S. Siegel, Kevin Keasey and Igor Filatotchev, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (OUP 2013) 308. 
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broader analytical framework. When considering how new technologies could be 
integrated into regulation a natural starting point is to revert to criteria that have 
been developed to evaluate the quality of regulation. Professor Robert Baldwin et al 
have identified five criteria that good quality regulation should meet.65 These are 
democratic legitimacy, accountability of the regulator, fair, accessible and open 
procedures, expertise and efficiency. In addition, Professor Julia Black has pointed 
out that good regulation focuses on achieving outcomes rather than technical 
compliance. In the following sub-section the use cases for regulatory technology 
highlighted in this paper will be analysed against these six criteria.   
 
1.DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.  
 
First, regulation should be supported by legislative authority. The acts of the 
regulator need to be legitimised by a mandate from a democratically elected 
parliament. The requirement for democratic legitimacy also affects the breadth of 
the mandate. For example, a statute that requires a regulator to collect reporting 
information on mortgages to ensure lending is being carried out in accordance with 
capital and other regulatory requirements, gives more specific legitimacy to the 
regulator than a statute which simply instructs the regulator to 'promote financial 
stability'.66  
Second, there should be an appropriate scheme of accountability. This criterion 
is connected with democratic legitimacy. If a regulator has a wide mandate involving 
a significant amount of discretion, it is all the more important for its decision making 
to be subject to oversight from democratically legitimated institutions. 
Accountability may be established by involving a parliament or other democratically 
elected body in the appointment or removal of leading decision makers working for 
the regulator. It may also be effected through the judiciary.67   
The creation of software that automates the reporting of specific data points 
involves technology providers making a decision on the scope of terms that have 
been expressed in natural language. This does not create problems for democratic 
legitimacy or accountability if the onus of identifying a particular programme 
remains with regulated entities. They would do so at their own risk. At present, they 
instruct lawyers and programmers to assist with developing a compliant IT solution. 
Regulatory software can help both types of service providers or perhaps even 
replace some of their work.  
Democratic legitimacy and regulatory accountability need to inform, however, 
the extent to which the regulator can out-source rule-making to technology 
providers. If the regulator decides, for example, to issue or endorse regulation in 
                                                
65 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd 
ed, OUP 2012) 25; see also Eilis Ferran, ‘Institutional Design: The Choices for National Systems’ in 
Moloney et al (n 37) 98 at 115-124 and John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N 
Gordon, Colin Mayer and Jennifer Payne, Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP 2016) 556-575. 
66 Baldwin et al (n 65) 143. 
67 Baldwin et al (n 65) 143. 
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machine readable natural language or in computer code, it needs to keep in mind 
that democratic legitimacy and accountability limit its ability to delegate the 
judgement involved in the translation process to third party providers. In particular, 
the potential involvement of large multinational technology providers in writing 
financial regulation will require special attention.  
Moreover, regulators need to be acutely aware that the limitations of data 
driven analysis is easily overlooked. Overlooking these may not only cause them to 
overlook problems. It may also cloud their ability to exercise judgement in 
accordance with democratically legitimated rules. Regulatory software should 
therefore be incorporated into the procedures operated by the regulator in a way 
that enables and encourages decision-makers to understand the scope of the data 
on which the analysis is based and preserves their ability to act in line with their 
democratic mandate exercising independent and accountable judgement. 
Likewise, functionalities automating enforcement based on data-driven analysis 
need to be carefully designed ensuring that the regulator remains in control of the 
process.  
 
2. FAIR, ACCESSIBLE AND OPEN PROCEDURES.  
 
A regulator may also claim legitimacy if it uses fair, accessible and open 
procedures. Due process is recommended both at the point of setting policy and 
writing regulation and at the point of enforcement.  
For policy setting and for the writing of regulation, trade-offs need to be made 
between allowing affected parties to participate and implementing the legislative 
mandate. Regulators operate in a polycentric environment. The different 
participants have different claims to legitimacy and engage in variety of regulatory 
conversations. There are conflicting demands that are difficult to reconcile.68  
Consultation is important. Regulation is the product of a regulatory conversation 
that allows the different constituencies to articulate their concerns and interests. 
Too much participation, however, may lead to less effective policy-making and 
eventually a stagnation of the regulatory system.69  
In relation to regulatory technology the FCA is carrying out a public 
consultation at the moment. With any consultation, the problem arises that better 
funded market participants are better able to participate actively in this process.70 
The regulator needs to ensure that this does not lead to regulatory capture. Capture 
occurs when the regulator prioritises the interests of regulated entities over the 
public interest.71  
For regulatory technology, the setting of policy and the writing of rules is 
intertwined with computer science. The technology has not settled yet and its 
                                                
68 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes’ (2008) Regulation and Governance 137; see also Armour et al (n 65) 556-560. 
69 Baldwin et al (n 65) 29. 
70 Armour et al (n 65) 558-560. 
71 Baldwin et al (n 65) 36; see also Armour et al (n 65) 560-562. 
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development costs money. Those who fund the development of the technology 
make the design choices. This gives a significant advantage to well-funded regulated 
entities enabling them to influence the process in a way which is hard to perceive. 
It is difficult to determine from the outside if particular functionalities reflect 
business reasons of the entities who provided the funding or are requirements 
rooted in the underlying computer science. The regulator therefore needs to be 
particularly careful to remain objective when integrating regulatory technology.  
Fair, accessible and open procedures also matter for enforcement. The 
requirements of due process need to inform functionalities that automate 
enforcement. This applies to regulatory technology reviewing individual data points 
as well as regulatory technology that selects and analyses data autonomously. If the 
analytical function of the technology is connected to an automated enforcement 
mechanism such as a ‘smart contract’ regulated entities need to be provided with 
procedures that enable them to set aside enforcement action.  
 
3. EXPERTISE  
 
The third criterion against which regulation can be evaluated is expert 
judgement. It is possible to justify regulatory intervention on the basis that a decision 
maker possesses expert judgement. Expertise can be a basis on which the public can 
be expected to have trust in regulatory decisions. It can justify supplying the 
regulator with a broader range of discretion.72  
Regulatory technology can generate high quality analysis. Machine learning can 
identify fact patterns in data that human analysts would take much longer to identify. 
This could inspire significant levels of reliance on regulatory technology to supervise 
regulated entities. An argument could be made that the deeper and broader analysis 
that can be achieved through artificial intelligence amounts to expert judgment, 
which justifies removing discretion from human decision makers.  
That would be a mistake. The technology is new and we do not yet fully 
understand all the possible implications. More generally, while the process of 
identifying risk that justifies regulatory intervention can be assisted by quantitative 
mechanisms, risk cannot be predicted with scientific certainty. Decisions about 
identifying risk and acting on such identification involve judgement and should be 
subject to accountability.73 
Moreover, problems of regulatory capture may arise also in relation to 
expertise. The FCA and the Bank of England have set up special units for regulatory 
technology.74 These are intended to work closely with regulated entities. Regulators 
have governance mechanisms in place to ensure that those setting policy are 
removed from close interaction with regulated entities. But at the moment there is 
                                                
72 Baldwin et al (n 65) 29-30. 
73 Julia Black, ‘The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public risk management in the United 
Kingdom’ (2005) Public Law 512. 
74 See above section 0. 
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a knowledge gap. Those setting policy at senior levels do not necessarily have 
technological expertise enabling them to critically evaluate the information they are 
presented with. The regulator needs to be sure that its senior decision makers have 
access to expertise enabling them to exercise professional judgement from the 
perspective of its democratic mandate and the public interest.75  
 
4. EFFICIENCY  
 
The fourth criterion against which regulation can be assessed is efficiency.  
Efficiency can be determined by reference to the implementation of the legislative 
mandate. Another way of assessing efficiency would be by reference to the results 
delivered by the regulatory process.  Either way efficiency often conflicts with social 
aims of regulation which are difficult to quantify and is therefore a contested 
criterion.76   
In relation to regulatory technology both the regulator and regulated entities 
are engaging in the process because they expect cost savings.77 At present there have 
only been experiments which have shown that a type of software that writes 
programmes that automate the reporting of one data point works. Nevertheless, the 
use of regulatory technology is in the FCA's business plan.78  
Time will tell if the savings delivered by regulatory technology outperform the 
cost involved in setting up and overseeing the mechanism that will evolve going 
forward. It is, for example, not yet clear how easy it will be to connect existing IT 
systems to new regulatory software. It is possible that regulated entities will need to 
spend significant amounts of money to make their legacy systems compatible with 
any new mechanism. An additional problem arises because such investments can be 
more challenging for smaller than for larger market participants.79  
 
5. PRECISION V FLEXIBILITY  
 
To determine efficiency the cost and the output of regulatory regimes are 
expressed in monetary terms and compared. Connected to this is the question of 
which type of rules best serves the respective aims of regulation. For regulatory 
technology, this aspect of designing regulation deserves a heading of its own. 
There is a choice between granular rules and general principles or standards. 
Granular rules are more certain, but inflexible.80 This can strangle competition and 
                                                
75 See also Chiu (n 7) 763. 
76 Baldwin et al (n 65) 31. 
77 Colaert (n 5) paras 43 and 178; Packin (n 5) 193 at 207. 
78 Financial Conduct Authority, Business Plan 2018/19, page 27 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/corporate-documents/our-business-plan-2018-19 accessed 16 
April 2018.             
79 Financial Conduct Authority, Feedback Statement FS 16/4 to Call for input on supporting the 
development and adopters of RegTech (July 2016 page 11 and 14 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs-16-04.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018; Colaert (n 5) 
pages or paras 3-4. 
80 Colin S Diver, 'The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules' (1983) 93 (1) Yale Law Journal 65. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210962 
 
                      14/2018 
 
 18 
stunt enterprise and growth.81 Granular rules can also encourage box ticking.82 
Principles and standards are flexible but come at the price of ambiguity which 
creates uncertainty.  
A hallmark of good regulation is the extent to which a regulator focuses on 
outcomes rather than on technical compliance.83 Following the financial crisis trust 
in the ability of regulated entities to align their business interests with regulatory 
aims has diminished. Regulators have become more interventionist. This, however, 
has not harmed the firm belief that ‘conduct should be in accordance with the 
principles and purposes of the rules, not the letter’.84 A good quality regulatory 
regime achieves more than technical compliance.   
We have seen that regulatory technology has been said to be capable of 
delivering more precise and certain rules.85 The capability of software to operate to 
high levels of precision is, however, also a limitation. Software is at present not as 
capable as natural language to operate flexibly. This may be a temporary issue that 
will be solved by computer scientists in the future.  
For the time being however, policy makers need to determine for which 
context high levels of precision are desirable. For the reporting of individual data 
points the current framework already operates at a high level of granularity. Creating 
software that automates this process through technology does not change this.  
It is nevertheless possible for unintended consequences to arise.86 For example, 
at present regulators receive transactions reports with a delay in time. If they identify 
problems regulated entities are able to make the point that these have been resolved. 
When the regulator receives real-time transactional information its systems can 
respond in real-time. There is a risk that this encourages regulated entities to orient 
themselves towards impressing the regulator in real-time. They could become too 
focused on real-time reporting, orient their business model accordingly and 
inadvertently overlook longer-term risks.  
This could have the same unwelcome effect that was generated by the 
requirements for quarterly reports for listed companies. In the post-mortem 
following the financial crisis it emerged that these reporting requirements caused 
companies to focus on generating positive short-term metrics and steered them 
away from making adequate provisions for long-term risks.87 
For assessments that are currently carried out using general principles or 
standards the use of regulatory software would change the regulatory design to a 
                                                
81 Ibid.  
82 Better Regulation Task Force, ‘Imaginative Thinking for Better Regulation’ (Cabinet Office, 2003) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100812083626/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/
upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/imaginativeregulation.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018, page 16. 
83 Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’, in Moloney et al (n 37) 218 at 245. 
84 Black, ibid 218 at 240; see also Armour et al (n 65) 551. 
85 Subsection Error! Reference source not found. above. 
86 Ibid; Burt et al (n 44) 5, see reference to the risk of 'incorrect disambiguation'. 
87 John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (July 
2012) paras 10.20-10.21 and Interim Report (February 2012) paras 4.14-4.15 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121204121011/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business
-law/corporate-governance/kay-review> accessed 18 June 2018. 
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more granular level. This may be desirable. The effect of increased levels of 
precision should nevertheless be the result of a deliberate decision in the respective 
context rather than an unintended effect using new digital technology.  
 
V. STRATEGIES FOR REGULATION 
In Section 4 we saw that delivering and claiming quality presents special challenges 
to integrating regulatory technology into regulation. Section 5 takes that broad 
argument to a more particular level by analysing how those challenges vary 
according to the regulatory strategy being put into effect. There are a variety of 
regulatory strategies available for financial regulation.88 The choice lies somewhere 
between control and freedom. Governments can either impose rules backed by 
sanctions or leave businesses to their own devices.89 Three principled options will 
be examined here: command regulation, a self-regulatory approach and meta-
regulation. We will see that different advantages and problems arise when 
technology is integrated into a command as compared to a meta-regulatory or self-
regulatory approach. It will also be shown that technology is not neutral. Its 
availability does not supply regulated entities with greater ability to make their 
business decisions align with the public interest.  
 
1. COMMAND REGULATION  
 
The essence of a command regulatory strategy is in its control of the 
achievement of certain outcomes by imposing sanctions where outcomes are not 
met. The government is in charge. It writes rules and designs sanctions through 
primary or secondary legislation and a regulatory body enforces them.90 The regime 
that was put in place after the financial crisis can in large parts be characterised as a 
command regime.   
A command approach could integrate regulatory technology.  The government 
could control the development, its maintenance and updates of the technology.91 It 
could issue software requiring regulated entities to run that software on their 
systems.  
This would address the problem that the coding involves policy choices.  
Making these choices would remain with the government or the regulator.  
Command regulation is generally associated with a preference for granular 
rules.92 This fits with the characteristics that are ascribed to digital technology which 
                                                
88 Black (n 83) 218; Baldwin et al (n 65) 34. 
89 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’ in Robert Baldwin, 
Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on Regulation (Oxford, 2010) 146. 
90 Baldwin et al (n 65) 106. 
91 Enriques (n 4) 5. 
92 Baldwin et al (n 65) 108-109. 
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generally struggles to integrate ambiguous terms.93 Using a more precise tool the 
regulator would be able to create a more certain framework. There is, however, a 
risk that a regulator with a preference for granularity overuses an instrument that 
can only operate to high levels of precision and produces a framework that suffers 
from inflexibility. This could make it difficult for different business models to thrive 
and creates a source for systemic risk.94  
Command regulation is said to be expensive for both the government and for 
regulated entities. The government needs to both write appropriate rules and 
develop an enforcement mechanism.95 In our context an additional cost factor is 
that a regulator who designs technology at an operational level would also have to 
assume a significant part of the technological risk.96  
If the regulator developed regulatory software the regulated entities would save 
the money they currently spend to design compliance solutions. They would, 
however, have to absorb the cost of connecting their existing IT systems with that 
software.  
It has already been mentioned that regulatory technology is particularly 
susceptible to capture. The line between policy decisions and computer science 
requirements is not a bright one and, in any event, not visible for non-experts. The 
regulators’ technology teams are necessarily closely involved with regulated entities. 
Senior decision makers are further removed but suffer from a knowledge gap. Under 
a command approach the risk of capture is particularly acute. This is because the 
regulator needs to rely on information provided by the industry to write rules. In 
giving information to the regulator, entities can exercise a 'degree of leverage over 
regulatory procedures', which can, over time, produce capture.97 If the regulator 
decides to integrate regulatory technology into a command framework robust 
governance mechanisms would have to be put in place to avoid the problem of 
capture.   
From the perspective of a potentially closed market of technology providers 
there are advantages associated with keeping its development close to the 
government which has significant bargaining power allowing it to exercise control 
over its content. This, however, comes at a price. The regulator needs to have 
sufficient resources to be able to have the expertise required to adequately oversee 
the operational aspects of the process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
93 Subsection Error! Reference source not found. above.  
94 Jon Danielson, 'Artificial intelligence and the stability of financial markets', VOXEU, 15 November 
2017 <https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-and-stability-markets> accessed 5 March 2018; 
Colaert (n 5) para 27. 
95 Baldwin et al (n 65) 110-111; see also Burt et al (n 44) 8. 
96 Colaert (n 5) para 51. 
97 Baldwin et al (n 65) 108. 
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 2. SELF-REGULATORY APPROACHES  
 
This approach to regulation relies on market mechanisms. The idea is that 
regulated entities have a business incentive to abide by certain standards.98 They 
want to impress their customers. These are sensitive to poor practices and this will 
ensure that appropriate standards are developed and observed.  
Self-regulatory approaches normally have some form of a statutory backing.99 
Self-regulation with a statutory mandate was the approach adopted in the UK 
between 1986 and 1998.100 It has since been discredited culminating in a statement 
by Joseph Stiglitz who referred to the idea that markets can self-regulate as an 
oxymoron.101 Following the financial crisis, self-regulation has been described as a 
model 'in retreat'.102   
An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of self-regulatory approaches 
is nevertheless useful here. As the memory of the financial crisis fades the financial 
services industry is likely to assert its influence over the policymaking process 
pushing for de-regulation.103 The current interest in regulatory technology is 
motivated by the perceived burden created by post-crises regulation and could be 
characterised as move in that direction.  
Self-regulatory approaches are likely to resurface particularly for regulatory 
technology. An argument could be made that the availability of new technological 
tools makes it possible for the regulator to step back and leave it to the market, now 
equipped with regulatory technology, to create appropriate frameworks.  
Under a self-regulatory approach the regulator would forget about regulatory 
reporting and would not get involved in participating in a distributed ledger. It could 
appoint an industry association and instruct it to develop risk-managing technology. 
Alternatively, it could require individual firms to adopt appropriate regulatory 
technology. For both approaches the government would endorse the technology at 
some high level but would not get involved in writing rules either in legal or 
machine-readable English or in computer code. It would stand back and let 
individual firms or their associations develop appropriate practices.   
Self-regulatory forms of regulation have been credited with advantages. The 
government does not pay for the design of the standards or for their enforcement.104 
Specialised knowledge can be built into regulation.105 Rules can be tailored to 
individual companies or sectors to higher degree than under a meta-regulatory 
                                                
98 Armour et al (n 65) 546. 
99 Baldwin et al (n 65) 137-139; Armour et al (n 65) 545-551. 
100 Black (n 83) 219-221. 
101 Eilis Ferran, ‘Institutional Design: the Choices for National Systems’ in Moloney et al (n 37) 98 at 110; 
Simon Deakin, ‘The Evolution of Theory and Method in Law and Finance’ in Moloney et al (n 37) 14; 
see also Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97; Julia 
Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-
Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103. 
102 Ferran (n 101) 98 at 110. 
103 Armour et al (n 65) 554; Deakin (n 101) 14 at 34-55. 
104 Baldwin et al (n 65) 140; Ogus (n 101) 97; Ferran (n 101) 98 at 110-111 and Burt et al (n 44). 
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model. This can facilitate regulatory innovation.106 Further, it has been suggested 
that regulated entities are more likely to comply with rules they have created 
themselves and that such rules would be more targeted making it easier to enforce 
them.107 Enforcement can moreover be delegated to specialist bodies which are able 
to impose industry appropriate, and thus more effective, sanctions.108 
There are also disadvantages associated with a self-regulatory approach. There 
are concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability when rules are made 
by self-regulatory bodies that are not bound by legislation or accountable to the 
government.109 The same problem arises in relation to enforcement. If a self-
regulatory body is more accountable to its members than general public, this is likely 
to prompt trust issues.110 It may find it difficult to enforce regulation where it would 
negatively affect its members’ business or reputation.111 Self-regulatory bodies can 
have a tendency to act anti-competitively by setting access requirements or prices 
that suit the interests of their members rather than the general public.112 This may 
stifle competition.  
Moreover, it would not be easy for industry associations to develop a common 
framework. Regulated entities can pool resources to fund technological 
development only in so far as they have overlapping interests. This makes it difficult 
for them to co-operate. For technology, finding common ground is particularly 
difficult not only because there are competing business interests but also because 
different entities have different legacy systems. Entities that have formed as a result 
of corporate restructuring sometimes operate more than one IT system because it 
has proven to be too difficult to connect them domestically. 
There is also a concern that regulated entities are unable to find much common 
ground between their interests and the public interest. They will then focus on being 
seen to be compliant rather than on ensuring that they actually meet the standards.  
Self-regulatory systems are said to be susceptible to gaming because there is no 
independent regulator monitoring compliance. 
The regulator could decide to use the availability of regulatory technology as 
an opportunity to review the interventionist approach that was adopted after the 
financial crises. It could take the view that the reforms have proven to be too 
expensive and limiting. It could modify its regulatory strategy. That is a matter for 
policy choice and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
regulatory models.   
                                                
106 Ibid, page 111. 
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(Cabinet Office, 2003) 46 
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upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/imaginativeregulation.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018. 
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The availability of new technological tools is, however, no reason to change 
gear. Technology does not change the fact that self-regulation relies on trusting 
regulated entities to adopt robust mechanisms. Both the advantages and the 
disadvantages of self-regulation apply for regulatory technology. The technology is 
not neutral. It serves those who develop it. It would be wrong to assume that any 
form of technology will allow us to have greater faith in the ability of regulated 
entities to align their business interest with the public interest. 
If anything, technology adds a level of complexity that has to inform regulatory 
decision making. For a self-regulatory model and perhaps more so than any other 
approach, the problem arises that the market for technology providers of data 
analysis has its own business models and has the potential to become quite 
concentrated. Technology providers and their business model could steer the design 
of the technology further away from the public interest.  
 
3. META-REGULATION  
 
Meta-regulation has been described as 'the state’s oversight of self-regulatory 
arrangements',113 and also as 'interactions between different regulatory actors or 
levels of regulation.'114 It occupies a middle ground somewhere between command 
regulation with a high level of government involvement and self-regulation with a 
minimal amount of government involvement. The regulator delegates risk control 
to the regulated entities themselves, giving them primary responsibility for the risk 
management systems, while the regulator audits, monitors and incentivises the 
systems. The regulator steers, the regulated entities row.115 
The regulator would not design or maintain regulatory software itself but 
oversee and validate its production. The regulator could specify requirements 
leading to the creation of a distributed reporting ledger leaving the development and 
maintenance of the system to regulated entities or their providers. The regulator 
could issue a machine-readable version of the rules for reporting specific data 
points. It could also issue technical specifications setting out some common 
operational standards but would refrain from developing particular software 
applications.116  
In the future, the regulator could step back from specifying which data is to be 
submitted or analysed leaving it to autonomous algorithms to work out patterns and 
information that is relevant for measuring risk. It would nevertheless remain 
involved in writing specifications for and in validating software that is used for these 
purposes.117  
                                                
113 Bridget Hutter, ‘Risk, Regulation and Management’, in Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jens Zinn (eds.), Risk 
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Keeping in mind that coding involves policy choices and that data generates a 
limited picture, the regulator would be able to set its level of involvement in a way 
that preserves democratic legitimacy and regulatory accountability. Moreover, 
procedural requirements could be prescribed such that the technology operates in a 
fair, accessible and open manner. 
Meta-regulation has been credited with the ability to generate a positive 
compliance culture, 'as firms are asked to think for themselves about the challenges 
of controlling' particular risks.118 For this benefit to materialise, however, firms must 
have both the 'capacity for self-regulation' and the 'internal resolve to self-
regulate'.119 Like principled-based regulation, which assumes that regulated entities 
are able to abide by certain principles,120 meta-regulation can fail when firms do not 
adopt appropriate rules or, for our context, appropriate technology because they are 
uninformed, ill-intentioned or give priority to business considerations.121  
Further, meta-regulation has been credited with low cost for the regulator.122 
From the perspective of the regulator, writing specifications and validating 
applications is cheaper than being involved in writing software applications. The 
regulator would have to invest to develop and preserve its ability to write 
appropriate specifications and approve the applications based on these, but it would 
not have to fund the full cost of developing regulatory software. These would be 
borne by regulated entities. By not involving itself at the operational level the 
regulator would also avoid responsibility for technological risk. These would have 
to be resolved between regulated entities and their service providers.  
From the perspective of regulated entities the cost of complying with meta-
regulation is also thought to be lower than the cost of complying with command 
regulation.123 By automating certain processes regulatory software could indeed 
make compliance cheaper for regulated entities. The initial cost of developing new 
digital technology that integrates into existing systems could, however, be 
significant.  
A meta-regulation model can facilitate the emergence of firm-specific rules.124 
Involving the regulator at a higher level of abstraction would make it possible for 
different firms to develop different types of regulatory software which fit both the 
regulatory specifications and their respective business models. This might help to 
alleviate concerns about systemic risk.  
                                                
title17-vol1-sec23-155/content-detail.html> accessed 22 June 2018). Title 17 part 23 rule 155 concerns 
the requirements for the calculation of margin requirements for swaps. Rather than receiving reports of 
individual data points the SEC sets requirements for and approves the methodology to be used by 
regulated entities. 
118 Ibid 148. 
119 Ibid, page 149. 
120 Black (n 83) 238-239; Armour (n 65) 549-551. 
121 Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford 1992) 120-128; Julia Black, ‘Talking 
About Regulation’ [1998] Public Law 77; see also Baldwin et al (n 65) 156-157. 
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123 Ibid 148. 
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Finally like for command and for self-regulation it remains to be seen how a 
meta-regulatory model will cope with the introduction of technology providers into 
the regulatory space.125 The regulator will have to develop an understanding of the 
business model of the technology providers and determine its level of oversight 
accordingly with a view to preserving the public interest. To be able to act as an 
effective monitor of software developed by an oligopolistic market will require a 
robust amount of expertise.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Regulatory technology is no silver bullet. It does not allow the regulator to have 
more faith in the ability of a regulated entity to align their profit-making goals with 
the public interest. The choice of regulatory strategy should not be affected by the 
availability of regulatory technology. For all three approaches discussed in this 
section, the role of the providers of regulatory technology needs to be addressed. 
This is most easily done for a command approach and quite difficult in a self-
regulatory model. If regulatory technology is integrated into a command approach, 
however, the problem could arise that requirements become increasing granular and 
inflexible which would stifle innovation and growth and could also increase levels 
of systemic risk. It would seem that a meta-regulatory model that preserves the 
regulator’s democratic mandate and accountability as well as procedural fairness 
would be a suitable way to integrate new digital technologies into regulation. Either 
way, the regulator will need robust technological expertise to make the technology 
work in the public interest.  
 
VI.CONCLUSIONS 
The article examined the use of new digital technologies for regulatory purposes. 
The analysis covered distributed ledger technology and two aspects of artificial 
intelligence: natural language processing and machine learning. To focus the 
discussion two potential use cases were examined in more depth: the use of 
distributed ledger technology and machine learning software to automate regulatory 
reporting requirements and the use of machine learning as a risk management tool.  
At an operational level these technologies could make compliance easier. They 
could make regulation more precise and supply the regulator with more accurate 
and real time information. The regulator could be enabled to supervise the whole 
population of regulated entities benefitting from granular evidence supplied in real 
time. The technologies could also assist the regulator and regulated entities in 
analysing this evidence allowing them to identify risk as it emerges. A natural starting 
point to evaluate regulatory technology is to review it against analytical criteria that 
                                                
125 See section 0. 
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have evolved in the mainstream regulatory discourse. A number of points emerge 
from this analysis.  
Regulatory technology integrates policy choice with coding software. 
Considerations of democratic legitimacy and accountability therefore limit the 
extent to which the regulator can leave the translation of regulation into software to 
third party technology providers.  
The regulator needs to avoid the temptation of over-estimating the scope of 
the evidence and analysis generated by new digital technologies. Data is a good and 
an objective source of information. Algorithms find patterns that humans overlook. 
But data is never complete. Regulatory legitimacy would be seriously undermined 
by an approach that fails to ensure that the scope of the evidence underlying data-
driven analysis is robustly communicated to the decision makers who rely on 
regulatory technology.  
Functionalities that automate enforcement need to incorporate requirements 
of due process.  
There is significant risk of regulatory capture. Policy decisions are connecting 
with coding decisions. The line between policy choice and computer science 
requirements is not a bright one and not visible to non-experts. The technology 
teams of the regulators are close to regulated entities and this may compromise their 
professional scepticism. Senior decision makers suffer from a knowledge gap. The 
regulator needs to invest in expertise.  
Unintended consequences can emerge. Real-time reporting could lead to short 
term thinking. Regulatory technology could cause regulation to become more 
granular, leading to inflexibility, technical rather than functional compliance and 
increasing standardisation. This could generate systemic risk.The providers of 
technology will play a significant role. They are for the time being small start-up 
enterprises. But the more the regulators rely on new digital technology the more 
attractive the market for regulatory technology will become for the handful of 
existing providers of data analysis. Their involvement in writing software that 
monitors risk may become similar to the role performed by credit rating agencies or 
auditors. This will bring with it the same difficult task of ensuring that the 
monitoring device that emerges serves the public interest.  
Regulatory technology is said to help deliver better quality compliance and 
regulation for less money. Time will tell if savings arising from automating processes 
and mechanising analysis will outperform the cost involved in developing, 
connecting and maintaining the technology on the existing legacy systems.  
In terms of identifying a suitable regulatory strategy the regulator has a number 
of options available. It could develop regulatory software exercising full control of 
its maintenance and update at an operational level. It could step back and appoint 
an industry association or leave regulated entities to create software that manages 
risk. The regulator would endorse this self-regulatory mechanism at a high level of 
abstraction but would not proactively involve itself in its development. It could 
adopt a meta-regulatory approach overseeing the development and maintenance of 
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regulatory software by private providers without having full control at an 
operational level. 
All types of regulation have advantages and disadvantages. In most regulatory 
contexts, a combination of various strategies of regulation are employed.126 The 
characteristics of regulatory technology will play out in different ways for each of 
these strategies and need to be accommodated accordingly. But technology is not 
neutral. It is programmed to reflect the preferences of those who oversee its 
development. While regulatory technology can change the game, it will not be able 
to change the fact that business interests do not always align with the interests that 
the regulator has been set up to serve. It would be wrong to assume that regulatory 
technology is a silver bullet that will make it easier for regulated entities to align their 
interests with regulatory standards.  
 
 
                                                
126 Baldwin et al (n 65) 132. 
